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WORKING DRAFT

27 November 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Secretary
United States Intelligence Board

Subject: Emergency Planning for USIB Committee on
Procurement of Foreign Publications

PURPOSE -

1. The broad emergency planning policy proposed herein is submitted in compliance with USIB D-7.1/2 of 5 June 1959. Its objective is to provide for carrying out the functions of the USIB Committee on Procurement of Foreign Publications (PROCIB) during conditions of nuclear war.

DISCUSSION -

2. Foreign language publications constitute an important source of intelligence information. While the nature, source and volume of this type of intelligence raw material will be greatly modified under conditions of nuclear war, the need for examining and exploiting it will continue. The importance to the national effort of intelligence derived from this source will be minimized at the outset of nuclear war and will increase to a peak in the latter stages of such a war in response to the requirements of military government and postwar planning in all fields of national endeavor.

3. It is assumed that the flow of open source foreign publications to the United States will cease for an indeterminate period after the initiation of nuclear war. At some point in time, impossible to fix at this stage of planning, some useful material of this nature will be collected and transported to the United States from neutral and allied countries. The flow of captured documents will commence at about the same time. These two sources constitute the primary means of acquisition of foreign documents for intelligence exploitation.

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4. The acquisition of foreign language documents (including publications) is merely a means to the end of exploitation. Apart from the specialized exploitation which might be required by the individual USIB member agencies, and provided for by them in their wartime emergency plans, the exploitation needs of the intelligence community will be served by:

a. The Armed Services Document Intelligence Center (ASDIC),
and,

b. [REDACTED] the Central Intelligence
Agency [REDACTED] 25X1A8a

Procedures and processes governing the handling of documents acquired for ASDIC exploitation will be effected through guidelines established during peacetime. Similarly, the procedures and processes leading to the wartime procurement of open source foreign publications could best be effected through peacetime established Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) which would become a part of the emergency planning directives of the individual USIB agencies, and be responsive to their individual and collective needs. Such SOPs could effectively fulfill, under wartime conditions, the advisory requirements of the USIB agencies as set forth in subparagraphs 1 a, b, and c of DCID 2/5. The procurement program coordination responsibility of the CIA, as set forth in paragraph 2 of DCID 2/5, could be similarly effectively fulfilled through CIA formulated SOPs. The PROCIB could fulfill its responsibilities, as set forth in paragraph 3 of DCID 2/5, through advising and assisting the CIA and the various USIB member agencies in the peacetime formulation of their emergency planning SOPs.

5. In arriving at a basic wartime emergency planning policy for the carrying out of the functions of any USIB established committee, the following factors should be considered:

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

CONFIDENTIAL

a. The paucity of the peacetime budget dictates a course of action least demanding of facilities requiring construction during peacetime.

b. The post attack criticality of manpower, funds, communications, transportation, and all other facilities and services dictates the maximum pooling of tangible assets and the minimization of duplicative effort.

c. The extreme post attack criticality of all tangible assets and ~~services~~ will render committee action infeasible in most fields. This condition will prevail until the commencement of a return to normalcy, at which time the increasing tempo of the intelligence effort, coupled with the returning availability of ~~services~~ and facilities, may indicate the desirability and feasibility of re-establishing the committee system.

RECOMMENDATIONS -

6. In view of the foregoing, the following basic planning policy for the carrying out of the functions of the USIB Committee on Procurement of Foreign Publications under conditions of nuclear war is recommended:

a. That the Committee on Procurement of Foreign Publications cease to exist at the initiation of hostilities until such time as USIB reactivates it in community interest.

b. That during the period of inactivation of PROCIB, the functions of that committee, as prescribed by DCID 2/5, be effectively fulfilled through the media of peacetime formulated SOPs.

CONFIDENTIAL

- 3 -